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ABSTRACT
The most cost-effective policies for achieving CO 2  abatement (e.g., carbon taxes) fail to get off the
ground politically because of unacceptable distributional consequences. This paper explores CO 2  abatement
policies designed to address distributional concerns. Using an intertemporal numerical general equilibrium
model of the U.S., we examine how efficiency costs change when these policies include features that
neutralize adverse impacts on energy industries.
We find that avoiding adverse impacts on profits and equity values in fossil fuel industries involves
a relatively small efficiency cost. This stems from the fact that CO 2  abatement policies have the potential to
generate revenues that are very large relative to the potential loss of profit. By enabling firms to retain only
a very small fraction of these potential revenues, the government can protect firms’ profits and equity values.
Thus, the government needs to grandfather only a small percentage of CO 2   emissions permits or, similarly,
must exempt only a small fraction of emissions from the base of a carbon tax. These policies involve a small
sacrifice of potential government revenue. Such revenue has an efficiency value because it can finance cuts
in pre-existing distortionary taxes. Because the revenue sacrifice is small, the efficiency cost is small as well.
We also find that there is a very large difference between preserving firms’ profits and preserving
their tax payments. Offsetting producers’ carbon tax payments on a dollar-for-dollar basis (through cuts in
corporate tax rates, for example) substantially overcompensates firms, raising profits and equity values
significantly relative to the unregulated situation. This reflects the fact that producers can shift onto
consumers most of the burden from a carbon tax. The efficiency costs of such policies are far greater than
the costs of policies that do not overcompensate firms.
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a.l.bovenberg@kub.nl goulder@leland.stanford.edu1 Indeed, the industry-distribution impacts may be more important politically than the household-
distribution impacts, since the stakes for each firm from these policies are high, while the impacts of abatement
policies on households, though important in the aggregate, are fairly small for each individual household.  Under
these circumstances, affected firms may be more willing to incur the costs of political mobilization than affected
households are.  This discussion invokes the notion of political mobilization bias, an idea originated by Olson
(1965).  For a discussion of this bias and other political transactions cost issues, see Williamson (1996, ch. 5).  For
an analysis of the implications of political mobilization bias for legislators’ choice of environmental policy
instruments, see Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1998).
2 This will be the case irrespective of the efficiency properties of abatement policies.  In the real world,
winners often cannot compensate losers through costless, lump-sum transfers.  Hence the most efficient policies –
those with the largest net benefits in the aggregate – may not yield actual Pareto improvements:  they may only be
potentially Pareto-improving.  In such a world, political feasibility may require designing policies that avoid
serious negative impacts on key stakeholders.  This may involve a sacrifice of some of the efficiency gains from the
I.  Introduction
Most studies of US CO 2  abatement policies have focused on the aggregate costs and benefits of
these initiatives.  Yet the desirability and political feasibility of these policies tend to hinge critically on
their distributional impacts.  A full assessment of CO 2  abatement options therefore requires attention to
distributional impacts.
Some studies -- including Poterba (1991), Bull, Hassett and Metcalf (1994), Schillo  et al. (1996),
and Metcalf (1998) -- have focused on the distribution of impacts of CO 2  abatement policies across
household income groups.  In these papers, the instrument for CO 2  abatement is usually a carbon tax.  This
tax is generally found to produce a regressive impact, although this impact is fairly small, especially when
one ranks households by measures of lifetime income (such as expenditure) rather than by annual income
(which includes transitory shocks and lifetime variations that make annual income a bad indicator of
permanent income).  Moreover, as indicated by Schillo  et al. (1991) and Metcalf (1998), the government
can reduce the regressive effect by lowering personal income tax rates at the bottom end of the income scale
and by raising public transfers.
A second important distributional dimension is the variation in impacts across industries.  CO 2
abatement policies such as carbon taxes or carbon quotas can reduce net output prices in the fossil-fuel
(carbon-supplying) industries and raise costs in industries that intensively employ fossil fuels as inputs. 
These price and cost impacts have the potential to seriously harm profits, employment, and equity values. 
The distribution of impacts along these dimensions crucially influences political feasibility, since
representatives of fossil-fuel producers carry significant weight in the political process.
1   CO 2  abatement
policies that pose serious burdens on these industries may stand little chance of political survival.
2   most efficient policy.
3 Grandfathering is a special case of free provision.  It is a legal rule whereby “old” entities (e.g., firms
subject to previous environmental rules) are waived of new regulatory requirements and remain bound only to the
earlier (and perhaps more lax) regulatory provisions. Under grandfathering, the free provision of permits is linked
to current production factors.  Newly entering firms are not eligible for a free provision, and investments in “new
capital” are not rewarded.
4 This is the same model as that in Goulder (1995a) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, 1997), with some
extensions to allow for attention to the industry-specific revenue-recycling and tradeable permits provisions
described below.
5 An exception is Jorgenson, Slesnick, and Wilcoxen (1992).
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This paper explores the distributional impacts of various U.S. CO 2  abatement policies in terms of
their impacts on profits and equity values for the industries supplying fossil fuels (the coal industry and
crude petroleum and natural gas industry) and the industries that rely heavily on fossil fuels as intermediate
inputs (e.g., petroleum refining and electric utilities.)  We examine a range of abatement policies, including
policies designed to avoid adverse consequences for the regulated industries.  As discussed below, some of
the adverse consequences can be avoided through industry-specific corporate tax cuts, direct transfers, and
the government’s free provision (or “grandfathering”
3 ) of emissions permits to firms.  A main purpose of
our paper is to assess the efficiency cost of avoiding adverse impacts through such policies.   
To perform this investigation we employ an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the U.S.
4  
The general equilibrium framework is especially useful for assessing the incidence of carbon policies.
Nearly all of the studies of distributional impacts of carbon policies have employed a partial equilibrium
framework that ignores behavioral responses to environmental taxes.
5    These studies impose exogenous
incidence assumptions and cannot analyze how behavioral responses affect pollution, efficiency and
distribution.  An applied general equilibrium analysis, in contrast, derives tax incidence endogenously from
the model-generated behavioral responses.  An important distributional consideration is the impact of CO 2
abatement policies on returns to labor and capital.  A general equilibrium framework is appropriate for this
purpose, since it captures important links between energy markets and factor markets. The model used here
is especially useful in this regard because it incorporates forward-looking investment behavior and the
adjustment costs associated with the installation or removal of physical capital.  These features enable us to6 Our model does not incorporate adjustment costs for industry-specific labor; indeed, labor is perfectly
mobile across industries.  To the extent that labor faces adjustment costs, one should explore capitalization effects
on labor along lines similar to this paper’s exploration of such effects on capital.
7 Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1999) show that while a carbon tax with revenues recycled through cuts in
marginal income tax rates produces efficiency gains,  reducing CO 2  emissions through a system of freely provided
(grandfathered) CO 2  permits may be an efficiency- reducing proposition: for any level of emissions reduction, the
environmental benefits will fall short of society’s costs of abatement!
8 Two revenue-raising policies are an emissions tax and a system of auctioned emissions permits, where
the permits are initially auctioned.  Under these policies, firms endure costs of emissions abatement and, for
whatever emissions they continue to produce, must either pay a tax or purchase permits.  In contrast, under a
system of freely provided emissions permits requiring equivalent emissions reductions, firms endure the same costs
of abatement but do not pay for remaining emissions.  Hence the burden on polluting firms is smaller.
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consider the capitalization effects of unanticipated policies.
6   Most other general equilibrium models treat
capital as perfectly mobile, and thus they cannot successfully examine impacts on profits or equity values. 
In such models, the impacts on industries are measured largely in terms of the effects on outputs.  The
results from this paper show that output effects are unreliable indicators of distributional effects.
Earlier analyses of CO 2  abatement policies reveal a tension between promoting economic
efficiency, on the one hand, and avoiding serious adverse distributional consequences to key industries, on
the other.  Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), Farrow (1999), Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), and Parry,
Williams, and Goulder (1999) show that policies that raise revenues and use these revenues to finance cuts
in pre-existing distortionary taxes have lower costs than policies that do not generate and recycle revenues
in this way.  The differences in the costs of the two types of policies can be large enough to determine
whether the overall efficiency impact -- environment-related benefits minus economy-wide costs of
abatement -- is positive or negative.
7     Yet the latter, less efficient policies impose a smaller financial
burden on the regulated industries because they do not charge firms for every unit of their pollution.
8   
These considerations suggest a conflict between efficiency and political feasibility: the efficient policy -- the
carbon tax -- appears less politically acceptable because it puts too much of a burden on politically
mobilized, fossil fuel industries, while the politically more acceptable policy of grandfathered carbon (or
CO 2 ) permits involves serious inefficiencies.
The present study finds that the choice between efficiency and insulating profits of key industrial
stakeholders (to enhance political feasibility) may be less problematic than previously thought.  We find
that “desirable” distributional outcomes at the industry level can be achieved at relatively low cost in terms
of efficiency:  without substantial added cost to the overall economy, the government can implement carbon
abatement policies that protect profits and equity values in fossil fuel industries.  The key to this conclusion9 Fullerton and Metcalf (1998) emphasize the importance of rents to the overall efficiency costs of policies
to reduce pollution.  They indicate that efficiency costs are substantially higher under policies that produce rents
that are not taxed away, in comparison with policies that do not produce rents that are left in private hands.  A
parallel line of investigation was conducted by Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), who show that policies that fail
to tax away rents are at a disadvantage in terms of efficiency because they fail to generate revenues that can be used
to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes.  Such policies thus fail to exploit an efficiency-enhancing  revenue-
recycling effect.  In the present study, we examine the extent to which policy-generated rents affect the impacts of 
CO 2  abatement policies on the profitability and equity values of regulated firms.
10 Correspondingly, if the government were to freely allocate 100 percent of the emissions permits, or
exempt 100 percent of inframarginal emissions from the base of a carbon tax, it would generate substantial
windfalls to firms: the rents produced and enjoyed by producers would be many times larger than the income losses
otherwise attributable to the policy.  The government does not need to be nearly this generous in order to safeguard
firms’ profits and equity values.  Our focus on the use of inframarginal exemptions to accomplish distributional
objectives is in the spirit of Farrow (1999), who employs a model along the lines of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)
with one factor of production (labor).  Our analysis differs from Farrow’s in its consideration of imperfectly mobile
capital and its attention to the implications of pollution-abatement policies for firms’ profits and equity values. 
11 Vollebergh  et al. calculate the tax revenues and abatement costs that would stem from a carbon tax
sufficient to reduce CO 2   emissions by 13 percent in the countries of the European Union. Their results indicate
that the revenues from this tax would be many times the policy-generated abatement costs.  This suggests that
exempting a small share of inframarginal emissions from the carbon tax (or grandfathering a small share of the
permits under a permits policy) would be sufficient to compensate the fossil fuel suppliers involved.
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is that CO 2  abatement policies have the potential to generate rents that are very large in relation to the
potential loss of profit.  Under a “standard” carbon tax policy, these potential rents do not materialize:
instead they become revenues collected by the government.  In contrast, under a policy involving freely
allocated emissions permits, or a policy in which some (inframarginal) emissions are exempted from a
carbon tax, firms realize some of the potential rents.
9   Because the potential rents are very large in relation
to potential lost profit, the government can protect firms’ profits and equity values in fossil fuel industries
by enabling firms to retain only a very small fraction of the potential rents.   Thus, the government needs to
freely allocate (as opposed to auction) only a small percentage of CO 2  emissions permits or, similarly, must
exempt only a small fraction of emissions from the base of a carbon tax.
10   Each of these government
policies involves only a small sacrifice of potential government revenue.  Such revenue has an efficiency
value because it can be used to finance cuts in pre-existing distortionary taxes.  Since these policies give up
little of this potential revenue, they involve only a small sacrifice in terms of efficiency.  In suggesting that
the revenue sacrifice is small relative to potential revenues, our findings complement those obtained in a
paper by Vollebergh, de Vries, and Koutstaal (1997), who employ a partial equilibrium model to compare
the potential tax revenues and abatement costs that could stem from a carbon tax in the European Union.
11
Because the potential rents are quite large, it is also possible to devise policies that, with relatively12 Felder and Schleiniger (1999) consider the efficiency costs of meeting the constraint that there be no
“monetary transfers” (that is, no change in overall tax payments) as a result of a carbon tax policy.  Using a
numerical general equilibrium model of Switzerland, they meet this constraint through industry-specific output
subsidies or labor subsidies.
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little loss of efficiency, protect not only the fossil fuel industries but also certain industries (such as
petroleum refining and electric utilities) that intensively use fossil energy.  These industries would suffer
significant profit losses under a standard carbon tax.
  We also find that there is a very large difference between preserving firms’ profits and preserving
their tax payments.  Allowing firms to enjoy a dollar-for-dollar offset to their payments of carbon taxes
(through industry-specific cuts in corporate tax rates, for example) substantially overcompensates firms,
raising profits and equity values significantly relative to the unregulated situation. This reflects the fact that
producers can shift onto consumers most of the burden from a carbon tax.  The efficiency costs of such
policies are far greater than the costs of policies that do not overcompensate firms.  To maintain firms’
profits, the government needs to offer tax relief representing only a small fraction of carbon tax payments.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief description of the
numerical general equilibrium model employed to evaluate the various policy alternatives.  Section III then 
indicates the links in the model between the various policy alternatives and firms’ profits and equity values. 
Section IV briefly describes the model’s data and parameters.  Section V indicates the policies under
consideration, and Section VI conveys and discusses the results from numerical simulations.  The final
section offers conclusions.
II.  The Model
This section outlines the structure of the intertemporal general equilibrium model employed in this
study.  The model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with international
trade.  It generates paths of equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the U.S. economy and the “rest of
the world” under specified policy scenarios.  All variables are calculated at yearly intervals beginning in the
benchmark year 2000 and usually extending to the year 2075.
The model combines a fairly realistic treatment of the U.S. tax system and a detailed representation13 Here the model applies the asset price approach to investment developed in Summers (1981).
14 The functions  f,  g, and  h, and the aggregation functions for the composites  E,  M, and  , are CES and ¯ xi
exhibit constant returns to scale.  Consumer goods are produced by combining outputs from the 13 industries in
fixed proportions.
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of energy production and demand.  It incorporates specific tax instruments and addresses effects of taxation
along a number of important dimensions.  These include firms' investment incentives, equity values, and
profits,
13  and household consumption, saving and labor supply decisions.  The specification of energy
supply incorporates the nonrenewable nature of crude petroleum and natural gas and the transitions from
conventional to synthetic fuels.
U.S. production divides into the 13 industries indicated in Table 1.  The energy industries   consist
of (i) coal mining ; (ii) crude petroleum and natural gas extraction; (iii) petroleum refining; (iv) synthetic
fuels; (v) electric utilities; and (vi) gas utilities.  The model also distinguishes the  17  consumer goods
shown in the table.
A.  Producer Behavior
General Specifications.  In each industry, a nested production structure accounts for substitution
between different forms of energy as well as between energy and other inputs.  Each industry produces a
distinct output  (X), which is a function of the inputs of labor  (L), capital  (K), an energy composite  (E) and
a materials composite  (M), as well as the current level of investment  (I):
(1) X ’ f(g(L,K),h(E,M)] & N(I/K) @ I
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the six energy industries, while the materials
composite consists of the outputs of the other industries:
(2) E ’ E(¯ x2, ¯ x3 % ¯ x4, ¯ x5, ¯ x6, ¯ x7)
(3) M ’ M (¯ x1, ¯ x8, ..., ¯ x13)
where   is a composite of domestically produced and foreign made input  i.
14   Industry indices correspond ¯xi
to those in Table 1.
Managers of firms choose input quantities and investment levels to maximize the value of the firm. 
The investment decision takes account of the adjustment (or installation) costs represented by     N( I/ K) @ I15 The function   N  represents adjustment costs per unit of investment.  This function expresses the notion
that installing new capital necessitates a loss of current output, as existing inputs ( K, L, E and  M) are diverted to
install new capital.
16 We assume representative oil and gas firms:  initial resource stocks, profit-maximizing extraction levels,
and resource-stock effects are identical across producers.
17 Thus, inputs 3 (oil&gas) and 4 (synfuels) enter additively in the energy aggregation function shown in
equation (2).
18 The world price is $19 per barrel in 2000 and rises in real terms by $5.00 per decade.  See Gaskins and
Weyant (1996).
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in  equation (1).   N is a convex function of the rate of investment,  I/K.
15
Special Features of the Oil-Gas and Synfuels Industries.  The production structure in the oil and
gas industry is somewhat more complex than in other industries to account for the nonrenewable nature of
oil and gas stocks.  The production specification is:
(4) X ’ (( Z) @ f[ g( L, K) , h( E, M) ] & N( I/ K) @ I
where  ( is a decreasing function of  Z, the cumulative extraction of oil and gas up to the beginning of the
current period.  This captures the idea that as   Z  rises (or, equivalently, as reserves are depleted), it
becomes increasingly difficult to extract oil and gas resources, so that greater quantities of  K,  L,  E, and  M
are required to achieve any given level of extraction (output).  Each oil and gas producer perfectly
recognizes the impact of its current production decisions on future extraction costs.
16   Increasing
production costs ultimately induce oil and gas producers to remove their capital from this industry. 
The model incorporates a synthetic fuel -- shale oil -- as a backstop resource, a perfect substitute
for oil and gas.
17   The technology for producing synthetic fuels on a commercial scale is assumed to
become known in 2020.  Thus, capital formation in the synfuels industry cannot begin until that year.
All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the domestic price of oil and gas.  The
path of oil and gas prices follows the assumptions of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum.
18   The supply
of imported oil and gas is taken to be perfectly elastic at the world price.     So long as imports are the
marginal source of supply to the domestic economy, domestic producers of oil and gas receive the world
price (adjusted for tariffs or taxes) for their own output.  However, rising oil and gas prices stimulate
investment in synfuels.  Eventually, synfuels production plus domestic oil and gas supply together satisfy
all of domestic demand.  Synfuels then become the marginal source of supply, so that the cost of synfuels19 For details, see Goulder (1994, 1995a).
20 Thus, we adopt the assumption of Armington (1969).
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production rather than the world oil price dictates the domestic price of fuels.
19
B.  Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of a representative household
maximizing its intertemporal utility, defined on leisure and overall consumption in each period.  The utility
function is homothetic and leisure and consumption are weakly separable (see appendix).  The household
faces an intertemporal budget constraint requiring that the present value of consumption not exceed
potential total wealth (nonhuman wealth plus the present value of labor and transfer income).  In each
period, overall consumption of goods and services is allocated across the 17 specific categories of
consumption goods or services shown in Table 1.  Each of the 17 consumption goods or services is a
composite of a domestically and foreign-produced consumption good (or service) of that type.  Households
substitute between domestic and foreign goods to minimize the cost of obtaining a given composite.
C.  The Government Sector
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services (outputs of
the 13 industries).  The tax instruments include energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax,
property taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on individual labor and capital income.  In the benchmark year, 2000,
the government deficit amounts to approximately two percent of GDP.  In the reference case (or status quo)
simulation, the real deficit grows at the steady-state growth rate given by the growth of potential labor
services.  In the policy-change cases, we require that real government spending and the real deficit follow
the same paths as in the reference case.  To make the policy changes revenue-neutral, we accompany the
tax rate increases that define the various policies with reductions in other taxes, either on a lump-sum basis
(increased exogenous transfers) or through reductions in marginal tax rates.
D.  Foreign Trade
Except for oil and gas imports, imported intermediate and consumer goods are imperfect
substitutes for their domestic counterparts.
20   Import prices are exogenous in foreign currency, but the
domestic-currency price changes with variations in the exchange rate.  Export demands are modeled as21 Since agents are forward-looking, equilibrium in each period depends not only on current prices and
taxes but on future magnitudes as well.
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functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income (in foreign currency).  The
exchange rate adjusts to balance trade in every period.
E.  Equilibrium and Growth
The solution of the model is a general equilibrium in which supplies and demands balance in all
markets at each period of time.  The requirements of the general equilibrium are that supply equal demand
for labor inputs and for all produced goods, that firms' demands for loanable funds match the aggregate
supply by households, and that the government's tax revenues equal its spending less the current deficit. 
These conditions are met through adjustments in output prices, in the market interest rate, and in lump-sum
taxes or marginal tax rates.
21
      Economic growth reflects the growth of capital stocks and of potential labor resources.  The growth of
capital stocks stems from endogenous saving and investment behavior.  Potential labor resources are
specified as increasing at an exogenous rate.
III.  Relationships between Carbon-Abatement Policies, Profits, and Equity Values
An important component of this study is the impact of  CO 2  abatement policies on the profitability
of firms that supply fossil fuels. The first part of this section describes in fairly general terms the model’s
treatment of firms’ profits and equity values, while the second part focuses on how abatement policies
affect these elements.  In all of this section we concentrate on the fossil fuel industries:  coal and oil&gas.
A.  Profits, Dividends, and Equity Values
Let  " denote the (fixed) ratio of carbon emissions to units of fuel (output) in the industry in
question, and let   Jc  denote the carbon tax rate per unit of emissions.  Then the carbon tax   Jc   requires a
payment of   Jc   " per unit of output  X.  The equity value of the firm can be expressed in terms of dividends
and new share issues, which in turn depend on profits in each period.  The firm's profits during a given22 For convenience, we assume that the accelerated depreciation schedule can be approximated by a
schedule involving a constant rate of exponential tax depreciation.
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period are given by:
(5) B ’ (1&Ja) (p& Jc")X & w(1 % JL)L & EMCOST & iDEBT & TPROP % LS % Ja(DEPL % DEPR)
where   Ja  is the corporate tax rate (or tax rate on profits),   p  is the output price,   w  is the wage rate net of
indirect labor taxes,  JL   is rate of the indirect tax on labor,   EMCOST  is the cost to the firm of energy and
materials inputs,   i  is the gross-of-tax interest rate paid by the firm,   DEBT  is the firm's current debt,
TPROP  is property tax payments,  LS  is a lump-sum receipt (if applicable) by the firm,  DEPL  is the
current gross depletion allowance, and   DEPR  is the current gross depreciation allowance.   TPROP equals 
Jp pK, s-1 Ks , where   Jp  is the property tax rate,   pK  is the purchase price of a unit of new capital, and   s  is
the time period.  Current depletion allowances,   DEPL , are a constant fraction   $  of the value of current
extraction:   DEPL = $pX .   Current depreciation allowances,   DEPR , can be expressed as   *
TK
T , where 
K
T  is the depreciable capital stock basis and   *
T  is the depreciation rate applied for tax purposes.
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The firm's sources and uses of revenues are linked through the cash-flow identity:
(6) B % BN % VN ’ DIV % IEXP
The left-hand side represents the firm's sources of revenues:  profits, new debt issue   (BN) , and new share
issues  (VN) .   The uses of revenues on the right-hand side are investment expenditure   (IEXP)  and
dividend payments   (DIV) .   Negative share issues are equivalent to share repurchases, and represent a use
rather than a source of revenue.
Firms pay dividends equal to a constant fraction,   a , of profits gross of capital gains on the
existing capital stock and net of economic depreciation.  They also maintain debt equal to a constant
fraction,   b , of the value of the existing capital stock.  Thus:
(7) DIVs ’ a Bs % (pK,s & pK,s&1)Ks & *pK,sKs
(8) BNs / DEBTs%1 & DEBTs ’ b(pK,sKs%1 & pK,s&1Ks)
Investment expenditure is expressed by:
(9) IEXPs ’ (1 & JK)pK,sIs
where   JK  is the investment tax credit rate.  Of the elements in equation  (6) ,  new share issues,   VN, are23 This treatment is consistent with the so-called “old view” of dividend behavior. For an examination of
this and alternative specifications, see Poterba and Summers (1985).
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the residual, making up the difference between   B + BN  and   DIV + IEXP .
23
Arbitrage possibilities compel the firm to offer its stockholders a rate of return comparable to the
rate of interest on alternative assets.
(10) (1 & Je ) DIVs % (1 & Jv ) (Vs%1 & Vs & VNs ) ’ (1 & Jb ) is Vs
The parameters   Je ,   Jv ,  and   Jb  are the personal tax rates on dividend income (equity), capital gains, and
interest income (bonds), respectively.  The return to stockholders consists of the current after-tax dividend
plus the after-tax capital gain (accrued or realized) on the equity value   (V)  of the firm net of the value of
new share issues.  This return must be comparable to the after-tax return from an investment of the same
value at the market rate of interest,   i .
Recursively applying equation (10) subject to the usual transversality condition ruling out eternal














































Equation (11) indicates that the equity value of the firm is the discounted sum of after-tax
dividends net of new share issues.  
B.  Abatement Policies and Equity Values
A Standard Carbon Tax.  Abatement policies affect equity values by altering firms’ profits and the
stream of dividends paid by firms.  A carbon tax, in particular, will tend to lower the profits of firms in the
industries on which the tax is imposed.  Figure 1 heuristically indicates the carbon tax’s implications for
the coal industry. 24 In the long run, in contrast, capital is fully mobile, production exhibits constant returns to scale,
and the supply curve is infinitely elastic.
12
The line labeled   S0  in the figure is the supply curve for coal in the absence of a tax.  This diagram
accounts for the quasi-fixed nature of capital resulting from capital adjustment costs.  The supply curve   S0 
should be regarded as an average of an infinite number of supply curves, beginning with the curve depicting
the marginal cost of changes in supply in the first instant, and culminating with the marginal cost of
changing supply over the very long term, when all factors are mobile.  This curve therefore indicates the
average of the discounted marginal costs of expanding production, given the size of the initial capital stock. 
We draw the supply curve as upward sloping, in keeping with the fact that in all time frames except the
very long run capital is not fully mobile and production exhibits decreasing returns in the variable factors --
labor and intermediate inputs.
24  
The supply curve represents the marginal costs associated with increments in the use of  variable
factors to increase supply.  Capital is the fixed factor underlying the upward-sloping supply curve.  The
return to this factor is the producer surplus in the diagram.  With an upward sloping supply curve, this
producer surplus   is positive.  The existence of producer surplus does not necessarily imply supernormal
profits.  Indeed, in an initial long-run equilibrium, the producer surplus is just large enough to yield a
normal return on the capital stock.  To illustrate, at the initial equilibrium with a market price   p0 and
aggregate quantity supplied  Q0,  the producer surplus amounts to the triangular area  bhd.  On a balanced
growth path, this producer surplus yields a normal (market) return on the initial capital stock so that the
value of the initial capital stock equals the price of investment (and thus Tobin’s  q is unity). 
Now consider the impact of an unanticipated carbon (coal) tax.  The introduction of this tax shifts
the supply curve upward to  S1.  As a direct consequence, the output price paid by coal consumers increases
from  p0 to   pD1.  However, since supply is not infinitely elastic, the suppliers of coal are not able to shift the
entire burden of the tax onto demanders.  Indeed, the producer price of coal declines to  pS1.  This causes
producer surplus to shrink to the area   cgd.   Since this triangle is smaller than the initial producer surplus,
the return on the initial capital stock (valued at the price of investment goods) falls short of the market rate
of return.  Hence, to satisfy the arbitrage condition, Tobin’s   q  falls below unity and the owners of the
capital stock suffer a capital loss. 
This analysis is complicated by the fact that the carbon tax can finance reductions in other taxes,
which may imply reductions in costs to firms.  This will tend to offset the carbon-tax-induced losses in
profits and the associated reductions in equity values.  To the extent that the carbon tax revenues finance13
general (economy-wide) reductions in personal or corporate income taxes, the reductions in tax rates will be
small and thus will exert only a small impact on costs to the fossil fuel industries.  If the revenues are
recycled through tax cuts targeted for the fossil-fuel industries, however, the changes in marginal rates can
be significant and the beneficial offsetting impact on profits and equity values may be more pronounced.  
Effects of Rent-Generating Policies.  In the diagram, the shaded rectangle  R  (with area  aegc)
represents the firms’ payments of the carbon tax.  If the government forgoes some of the carbon tax
revenue, and allows producers to retain this potential revenue as a rent, the impact on profits, dividends,
and equity values can be fundamentally different.  Consider, for example, the case in which the government
restricts  CO 2  emissions through a system of carbon permits.  Since such emissions are proportional to coal
combustion, the government can accomplish a given percentage reduction in emissions from coal by
restricting coal output by that same percentage through the sale of a limited number of coal-supply permits. 
For comparability, suppose that the number of permits restricts supply to the level  Q1  in the figure.  If the
permits are auctioned competitively, then the government (ideally) collects the revenue   R   from sale of the
permits and the effects on firms are the same as under the carbon tax.  In contrast, if the permits are given
out free (or “grandfathered”), then the area  R represents a rent to firms.  The government-mandated
restriction in output causes prices to rise, but there is no increase in costs of production (indeed, marginal
production costs are lower).
As suggested by the figure, this rent can be quite large and, indeed, can imply substantial  increases
in profits and equity values to the regulated industries.   In the figure, the post-regulation profits enjoyed by
the firm are given by the sum of areas  R and area  cgd.  Here post-regulation profits are many times higher
than the profit prior to regulation ( bhd).   Owners of industry-specific capital enjoy a capital gain as
Tobin’s  q  jumps above unity.  Intuitively, by restricting output, government policy allows producers as a
group to exploit their market power and reap part of the original consumer surplus.
Using comparable diagrams, it is straightforward to verify that the magnitude of the profit increase
under a system of grandfathered emissions permits depends on:
a.  The extent of abatement (or number of permits issued relative to “business-as-usual”
emissions).  The regulation-induced increase in profit is represented by the difference between the areas of
the rectangular area  aefb and the triangle  fhg.  For incremental restrictions in supply, the former will be
larger than the latter (if demand is less than infinitely elastic).  Thus producers must gain.  However, this is
not necessarily the case as the magnitude of the required reduction in supply gets larger.  If the demand14
curve has a “choke price” (a price above which demand is strictly zero), then the potential rent will shrink
to zero as the extent of abatement approaches 100 percent.
b.  The elasticity of supply.  The potential to enjoy significant additional profits from restrictions
on output is larger, the higher the elasticity of supply.  In this case, most of the burden associated with
reductions in output is borne by consumers, and a large share of the rent rectangle  R represents an increase
in producer surplus -- that is, most of  R  will lie above  p0.  In contrast, if supply is inelastic (as in the case
where adjustment costs are substantial), very little of the rent rectangle  R  represents an increase in
producer surplus because much of it extends below the initial output price   p0.  In this case, restrictions in
output do not enable producers to expropriate much of the consumer surplus.  Thus, the rectangle  aefb will
be smaller than the triangle  fhg, and profits will fall.
A small income share of the fixed factor (i.e., capital in our model) contributes to a large supply
elasticity.  A large supply elasticity (or flat supply curve) implies that the producer surplus  bhd (i.e., the
income to the fixed factor) is small while most of the area  R will lie above  p0. Hence the additional profits
will be large compared to the initial producer surplus.
c.  The elasticity of demand.   If demand is highly elastic, the policy-induced reduction in output
gives firms relatively little market power -- only a small part of  R will lie above  p0.  In contrast, if demand
is inelastic, the abatement policy enables firms to exercise substantial market power.  In this case, much of 
R will lie above  p0, and firms will be able to expropriate a considerable amount of the consumer surplus. 
The aggregate elasticity of demand for a given fossil fuel will reflect the elasticities of substitution inherent
in the production functions of domestic users of coal.  In addition, the response of demand will reflect the
extent to which the government “insulates” domestic fossil fuel producers from foreign competition.  In
particular, the elasticity of demand will be smaller, and the potential to enjoy large rents larger, to the
extent that the government accompanies taxes on domestic production with levies on imports of fossil fuels
and subsidies to exports of such fuels.  Carbon taxes or auctioned emissions permits applicable to imported
fuels cause the imported fuel prices to rise in tandem with the prices of domestic fuels, thus preventing
domestic consumers from shifting demands to imported fuels.  Export subsidies ensure that the prices of
exported fuels do not rise relative to foreign fuel prices, and thus they help to sustain foreign demand for
domestically produced fuels.
Under rent-generating policies, the rectangle  R corresponds, in a dynamic context, to:  
(12) ( )( )( ) ( ) , , , 1 1 1 1 1 - - -
=
¥
￿ n t m a D t S t t t
s t
p p Q s25 Farrow (1999) describes and evaluates a policy of this sort.  See also Pezzey (1992).
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The factors   1-<   and   1-Ja  respectively address the fact that the rents are subject to the personal and
corporate income taxes.  Here  Q1,t represents gross output (under the policy change) at time  t .
A system of grandfathered permits is not the only form of regulation that would enable firms to
capture much of  R.   Firms could capture some of   R  under a carbon tax policy in which “inframarginal”
emissions (emissions below some trigger level) are exempt from the tax, while all emissions beyond that
level face the tax.
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In sum, the impact on firms’ profits and equity values can be fundamentally different, depending on
how much of the area  R  is retained by firms, rather than collected by the government.  It also depends on
how much of the area  R lies above the initial equilibrium price.  This, in turn, will depend on the extent of
abatement and on elasticities of supply and demand.  We will return to these issues in the discussion of
policy results in Section VI.
IV.  Data and Parameters
Data documentation is in Cruz and Goulder (1992), which is available on request.  Industry input
and output flows (used to establish share parameters for production functions) were obtained from the 1988
input-output table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce.  This table is
also the source for consumption, investment, government spending, import, and export values by industry. 
Data on industry capital stocks derive from Bureau of Economic Analysis (1991).  Employment by
industry was obtained from the October 1990  Survey of Current Business.  To form the benchmark data
set, these data are projected to the year 2000 based on the average growth of real GDP from the relevant
historical period to 1998.  Data on the carbon content of fossil fuels were obtained from the 1998
Department of Energy  Annual Energy Outlook.  
Elasticities of substitution determine the industry and household price elasticities of demand.  We
derive the production function elasticities by transforming parameters of translog production functions
estimated by Dale Jorgenson and Peter Wilcoxen.  The capital adjustment cost parameters are based on
Summers (1981).  26 This lies midway in the range of estimates displayed in the recent survey by Russek (1996).
27 This value falls between the lower estimates from time-series analyses (e.g., Hall, 1988) and the higher
ones from cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lawrance, 1991).
28 In the simulations, we have approximated environmental neutrality by scaling the results of a uniform
carbon tax of $25 per ton carbon by discounted emission reductions. We find that efficiency outcomes from the
model are close to linear within the small range of variation in emissions reductions, so that this type of scaling
does not significantly affect the interpretation of results.
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Other important parameters apply to the household side of the model.  The elasticity of substitution
in consumption between goods and leisure,  L, is set to yield a compensated elasticity of labor supply of
0.4.
26   The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,  F, equals .5.
27   The intensity parameter
"C  is set to generate a ratio of labor time to the total time endowment equal to .44.  These parameters imply
a value of 0.19 for the interest elasticity of savings between the current period and the next.
V.    Abatement Policies Investigated
In nearly all simulations, the tool for abatement is the carbon tax (although we also consider CO 2
quotas or tradeable permits, as discussed below).  All policies are unanticipated and phased in smoothly
(with equal increments to the carbon tax) over a three-year period beginning in the base year, 2000.  The
carbon tax is levied “upstream;” that is, the tax is imposed on suppliers of fossil fuels: producers of coal
and of oil&gas.  To prevent an adverse impact on the international competitive position of fossil fuel
producing industries, exports of fossil fuels are exempted from the carbon tax while imports of these fuels
are subject to the carbon tax.  Nearly all proposals for a U.S. carbon tax include export and import
elements of this type.
The policies differ in two main ways: (1) the way the gross revenues from the carbon tax are
recycled to the private sector, and (2) the extent to which the policies create and leave rents for the
regulated firms.  We normalize the carbon tax so that discounted carbon emissions are the same across the
policies.
28   We do not allow for public debt policy.  Hence, all gross revenues from the carbon tax are
immediately returned to the private sector.
A.  Starting Point:   Policies without Distributional Adjustments 29 To express the equity values in real terms, we adopt the ideal price index that is associated with the
utility function of the representative household.   
30 Thus we focus on four of the six energy industries identified in the model.  We give less attention to the
natural gas delivery industry, which experiences considerably smaller impacts from the abatement policies, and the
synfuels industry, which does not emerge significantly until 2025.
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 The first set of policies involves broad-based revenue-recycling and thus does not attend to
distributional concerns.  These policies involve three alternative ways to recycle the revenues:  higher lump-
sum transfers to households, lower personal income tax rates, and lower corporate income tax rates. We
implement these recycling options by using the recycling instrument to endogenously balance the
government budget.    
The other policies involve additional elements to address important distributional considerations. 
Thus these policies involve not only  environmental neutrality (the reductions in emissions are normalized
across policies) and  revenue neutrality (all gross revenues are recycled) but also some form of
distributional neutrality.  The attention to distributional neutrality is motivated by concerns about equity
and political feasibility.
B.  Imposing the Requirement of “Equity-Value Neutrality”
  The first group of policies to attend to distributional neutrality adds the constraint that the real
29
value of equity of the principally affected industries must not be changed (that is, reduced) at the time the
abatement policy is announced and implemented.   We call this the requirement of equity-value neutrality. 
The most vulnerable industries are fossil-fuel supplying industries (coal and oil&gas), the petroleum
refining industry, and the electric utilities industry.
30   The constraint on the value of equity can be
interpreted as the requirement that industry-specific production factors not be hurt by the carbon tax.  In
the model, labor is perfectly mobile across industries while capital is subject to adjustment costs.  Since
capital is the only the industry-specific production factor, the effect on the value of capital represents the
impact of the carbon tax on industry-specific production factors.  Unanticipated policies yield
instantaneous changes in the value of industry-specific wealth, as measured by changes in the equity values
of different industries.  
We consider several mechanisms for achieving equity-value neutrality: (1) industry-specific cuts in
corporate tax rates, (2) lump-sum transfers to capital employed in particular industries, and (3)31 They are equivalent under appropriate scaling of the two policies: the limit on emissions under the
permits program must be the same as the level of emissions that occurs under the carbon tax.
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inframarginal exemptions to the carbon tax. Our model abstracts from uncertainty and from heterogeneity
across firms within a given industry.  In such a model, a policy involving emissions permits, in which a
certain fraction of the permits is given out free (rather than auctioned), is equivalent to a carbon tax policy
in which the same fraction of (inframarginal) emissions is exempt from the carbon tax.
31   Thus, the third
policy can be interpreted as one where the government controls emissions through emissions permits, and
freely allocates or “grandfathers” some of these permits.  We simulate this policy by imposing a $25 per
ton carbon tax and rebating to the firm a share of its tax payment, with the share corresponding to the
percentage of emissions that are exempt from the tax.  The rebate is lump-sum from the firm’s point of
view.  Under this simulation, output and emissions from the coal and oil&gas industries rise through time. 
Hence, this corresponds to an emissions permit policy in which the number of permits in circulation
increases through time.
In our simulations, the policies with inframarginal exemptions have the potential to produce
dramatic impacts on profits and equity values.  For this reason, we perform additional policy experiments
involving inframarginal exemptions of various magnitudes.  In these experiments, we do not aim to achieve
equity-value neutrality, but instead focus on how profits, equity values, and other important variables are
affected by the magnitude of the exemptions.  The policies introduced under this heading are an emissions
permit system where 100 percent of the permits are grandfathered, and a carbon tax with inframarginal
exemptions equal to 50 or 90 percent of first-period emissions under the unregulated status quo.  The rents
generated by each of these policies face the same taxes as other producer income, and thus are subject to
the corporate income tax.  
These policies involve three instruments to achieve three targets.  The carbon tax rate assures
environmental neutrality (the same emissions reductions), the adjustment to the personal income tax rate 
yields revenue-neutrality (all additional revenues from the carbon tax must be recycled), and the industry-
specific corporate income tax cuts, lump-sum payments, or inframarginal exemptions bring about equity-
value neutrality.  
   
 
C.  Imposing the Requirement of “Tax-Payment Neutrality”32 Indeed, in several countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, additional environmental taxes
raised from energy-intensive industries are earmarked for technology subsidies to this sector.  
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In the political arena, a popular indicator for distributional neutrality are the tax payments of a
particular industry.
32   According to this alternative notion of distributional neutrality, a given industry’s
overall tax payments from carbon taxes, corporate taxes, property taxes and indirect labor taxes should
remain constant.  We term this tax-payment neutrality.  As instruments for this type of neutrality we
consider industry-specific corporate tax cuts and explicit lump-sum transfers to sector-specific capital.  As
with the simulations involving equity-value neutrality, the tax-payment neutrality simulations involve policy
packages in which three instruments achieve three targets.
VI.  Simulation Results
A.  Policies without Distributional Adjustments
1.  Lump-Sum Recycling
We begin by examining the effects of the $25 per ton carbon tax with lump-sum recycling.  Results
are displayed in the first numbered column of Table 2.  The table shows the impacts on prices, output, and
after-tax profits for years 2002 (two years after implementation) and 2025.  
The coal industry experiences the largest impact on prices and output.  In this industry, prices rise
by about 54 percent by the time the policy is fully implemented (year 2002) and the price increase is
sustained at slightly above that level.  The price increase implies a reduction in output of about 24 percent
in the long run.  The other major impacts on prices and output are in the oil&gas, petroleum refining, and
electric utilities industries.  Although the carbon tax is imposed on the oil&gas industry, the price increase
is considerably smaller than in the coal industry, reflecting the lower carbon content (per dollar of fuel) of
oil and gas as compared with coal.  There are significant increases in prices and reductions in output in the
petroleum refining and electric utilities industries as well, in keeping with the significant use of fossil fuels
in these industries.  The reductions in output are accompanied by reductions in annual after-tax profits. 33 This is the reduction in emissions associated with domestic consumption of fossil fuels.  It accounts for
the carbon content of imported fossil fuels, and excludes the carbon content of exported fossil fuels.  These figures
do not adjust for changes in the carbon content of imported or exported refined products.  The percent change in
emissions is the percentage change, between the reference case and policy-change case, in the “present value” of
emissions, where the emissions stream is discounted using the after-tax interest rate.  If marginal environmental
damages from emissions are constant, the percentage changes in discounted emissions will be equivalent to
percentage changes in damages.
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Associated with these output reductions is a reduction in CO 2  emissions of about 18 percent.
33
The reductions in after-tax profits are associated with reductions in equity values.  As shown in
Table 3, the largest equity-value impacts are in the coal industry, where such values fall by about 28
percent.  The reductions in equity values in the oil&gas, petroleum refining, and electric utilities industries
are also substantial, in the range of 4.8 to 6.3 percent.  As indicated in the table, the impacts on equity
values of other industries are relatively small.
Table 3 also indicates efficiency impacts.  We employ the equivalent variation to measure these
impacts.  This is a gross measure because our model does not account for the benefits associated with the
environmental improvement from reduced emissions.  As indicated in the table, the policy implies a gross
efficiency loss of approximately $103 per ton of emissions reduced, or 73 cents per dollar of discounted
gross revenue from the carbon tax.  
2.  Personal Income Tax Recycling
Policy 2 recycles the revenues through personal income tax cuts rather than via lump-sum
payments.  As shown in the second numbered column of Table 2, such recycling does not alter very much
the impacts of the carbon tax on prices and output.  Furthermore, such recycling only slightly attenuates the
impacts on profits and equity values in the most affected industries.  However, as indicated in Table 3, this
form of recycling reduces the economy-wide efficiency costs by over 40 percent.  The equivalent variation
is about $60 per ton of emissions reduced, and 42 cents per dollar of discounted carbon tax revenues. The
reason for the smaller efficiency losses with personal-income-tax recycling is that, by lowering the marginal
rates of the personal income tax, this recycling helps lower the distortionary costs of the personal income
tax.  This efficiency consequence has been termed the  revenue-recycling effect.  Despite the lower
distortionary taxes, the carbon tax package still imposes gross efficiency costs because it tends to raise
output prices and thereby reduce real returns to labor and capital.  This  tax-interaction effect tends to
dominate the revenue-recycling effect.  Hence the carbon tax still involves an overall economic cost34 This exemplifies the now-familiar result that, abstracting from the value of the environmental
improvement they generate, green taxes tend to be more costly than the “ordinary” taxes they replace.  Although
this is the central result, the opposite outcome can arise when the pre-existing tax system is suboptimal along non-
environmental dimensions (for example, involves overtaxation of capital relative to labor) and the introduction of
the environmental reform helps alleviate the non-environmental inefficiency.  For analysis and discussion of this
issue see Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995b), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997, 2000),
and Parry and Bento (1999).
35 See, for example, Jorgenson and Yun (1991), and Goulder and Thalmann (1989).
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(abstracting from the environmental benefits), even when the revenues are devoted to cuts in the personal
income tax.
34
3.  Corporate Income Tax Recycling    
The carbon tax revenue can be used instead to reduce the corporate income tax (Policy 3).  This
type of recycling further reduces the gross efficiency costs of emission reductions to 34 percent of
discounted carbon tax revenues.  Thus, corporate tax recycling appears to be more efficient than personal
tax recycling.  This indicates that, in the model, the corporate tax is more distortionary than the personal
income tax in the initial equilibrium.  Although there is considerable disagreement as to the distortionary
impacts of the corporate income tax, these results are consistent with the prevailing results from other
applied general equilibrium analyses.
35   In the U.S. economy, taxes on capital investment such as the
corporate income tax appear to be more distortionary than labor income taxes or the personal income tax (a
tax on both capital and labor income).
A cut in the corporate tax rate benefits the owners of capital because it reduces the tax burden on
earnings from the installed capital stock.  As a result, compared to the cases with lump-sum recycling or
personal-income tax recycling, in the most affected industries (coal, oil&gas, petroleum refining, and
electric utilities), firms’ equity values fall less.  Indeed, the value of equity in the oil&gas sector is almost
unaffected by this policy package.  While corporate income tax recycling significantly changes the impact
on equity values, it makes relatively little difference to output patterns.  This indicates that changes in
industry output are an unreliable measure of the impact of environmental policy on the real earnings of
industry-specific production factors.    
B.  Policies Achieving Equity-Value Neutrality  36 We are grateful to Ruud de Mooij for suggesting this diagnostic experiment.
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We now consider policies that introduce an additional instrument to alter the distributional impacts. 
We start with results from policies that impose the requirement of equity-value neutrality. 
1.  Industry-Specific Cuts in the Corporate Income Tax 
 Policy 4 achieves equity-value neutrality through industry-specific adjustments to corporate tax
rates (with the remainder of the revenues recycled via cuts in the personal income tax).  This appears to be
an efficient way to attain such neutrality.  In fact, as indicated in Table 3, the gross efficiency losses are
smaller than in the case where this constraint is not imposed (Policy 2), suggesting that there is no trade-off
between efficiency and distributional neutrality in this case.  Two factors help explain this result.  First, in
our model the corporate income tax is more distortionary than the personal income tax, as indicated by the
difference in efficiency costs of policies 2 and 3.  Under Policy 4, the efficiency benefit from cutting the
corporate tax rate is offset by the need to finance these cuts through the personal income tax -- that is, the
personal tax cannot be lowered as much under this policy as under Policy 2, which involves no corporate
income tax cuts.  Since the corporate tax is more distortionary than the personal tax, there is an overall
efficiency benefit from this “tax-swap.”
A second reason for the relatively low efficiency cost relates to tax distortions in the fossil fuel
industries.  The carbon tax significantly raises the overall taxation of energy industries relative to other
industries.  On non-environmental grounds, these industries are over-taxed relative to other industries. 
Targeted corporate tax cuts undo some of the non-environmental distortions attributable to the carbon tax. 
We have verified this effect by performing an additional simulation experiment which (like Policy 3)
recycles some carbon tax revenues through reductions in the overall corporate tax rate, but also (like Policy
4) recycles sufficient revenues in the form of  additional corporate tax cuts for the energy industries to
preserve equity-values in those industries.  This policy involves an efficiency cost of $40.9 per ton,
significantly lower than the efficiency cost per ton under Policy 3.  The difference between this policy and
Policy 3 is that this policy includes the additional, targeted corporate income tax cuts.  Thus there is a
(gross) efficiency benefit from reducing the “excess” taxation of energy industries under the carbon tax.
36  
This is a second reason why Policy 4's efficiency cost is lower than that of Policy 2.37 There are other transition costs, such as the unemployment costs that may result from reduced output. 
These are not captured in our analysis.
38 This policy imposes equity-value neutrality only for the coal and oil&gas industries, since the carbon tax
(and its exemptions) or emissions permits apply only to these industries.  The government would need to invoke
additional instruments to achieve equity-value neutrality in other industries.
39 Three modeling assumptions underlying this correspondence may be noted.  First, the equivalence
between a carbon tax policy and an carbon-emissions permits policy would not hold in a more general model in
which regulators faced uncertainty.  In the presence of uncertainty, taxes and permits policies intended to lead to a
given level of emissions will generally yield different aggregate emissions  ex post.  Second, we assume that a cost-
effective allocation of emissions responsibilities is achieved under the permits policy.  This implicitly assumes that
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2.  Industry-Specific Lump-sum Transfers
Policy 5 produces equity-value neutrality through industry-specific lump-sum transfers.  This
appears to be an inexpensive way to ensure distributional neutrality:  relatively small lump-sum transfers
ensure that the real value of equity is not affected by the carbon tax.  These small transfers absorb
relatively little revenue, allowing personal income tax rates to be cut almost as much as under Policy 2. 
The cost of emissions abatement (relative to Policy 2) is raised by only a small amount: from $60.0 to
$60.4 per ton.
3.  Grandfathered Emissions Permits
As discussed in Section II, emissions quotas or permits, by forcing firms to restrict output, can
create rents for the regulated industries.  At the same time, there are costs to these industries connected with
the reduction in output and the associated need to remove capital or retire capital prematurely.
37    The
question arises whether the policy-induced rents might be sufficient to compensate firms for the other costs
associated with abatement.
38   
We consider this issue with Policy 6.  Here we introduce a carbon tax but grant firms exemptions
to this tax for a certain percentage of their actual emissions.  It deserves emphasis that the value of the
exemption, although tied to actual emissions in the industry (in the aggregate), is exogenous from the firm’s
point of view.  As discussed in Section V, this experiment can also be interpreted as a policy where the
government introduces a tradeable permits program, but grandfathers a percentage of the permits.  The
special case (to be considered later) where the firm enjoys a 100 percent (inframarginal) exemption from
the carbon tax corresponds to the case of fully grandfathered emissions permits.
39any differences in abatement costs  (associated with heterogeneity in firms’ production methods) are ironed out
through trades of permits.  Third, our model does not distinguish new and old firms (although it does distinguish
installed and newly acquired capital).  The model’s treatment of grandfathering is most consistent with a situation
in which only established firms enjoy the freely offered emissions permits, where these permits are linked to the
(exogenous) initial (or “old”) capital stock.
40 Table 3 reveals that it is more costly to achieve equity-value neutrality through partial grandfathering of
emissions permits (Policy 6) than through lump-sum payments to firms (Policy 5).  The difference can be attributed
to differences in the treatment of importers of fossil fuels under the two policies.  Both policies can be interpreted
as a carbon tax plus an inframarginal lump-sum rebate.  Under Policy 5, the rebate or lump-sum payment is offered
only to domestic fossil fuel producers.  In contrast, under Policy 6, the rebate (via grandfathering) is offered both to
domestic fossil fuel producers and to importers of fossil fuels.  Under Policy 6, the government is somewhat more
generous and forgoes more tax revenue; hence the added efficiency cost. Another difference between the policies is
that the petroleum refining and electric utilities industries receive direct compensation under Policy 5, but enjoy no
protection under Policy 6.  This would tend to raise the costs of Policy 5 relative to Policy 6.  However, this cost-
impact is more than offset by the differences just described in the treatment of importers.
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Perhaps surprisingly, only a very small percentage of emissions permits need to be grandfathered in
order to achieve equity-value neutrality.  Only 15 percent need to be grandfathered in the oil & gas
industry, and an even smaller percentage -- 4.3 percent -- must be grandfathered in the coal industry!  As a
result, the goal of distributional neutrality can be achieved at a small cost in terms of efficiency.  Earlier
research has made clear that there is a trade-off between efficiency and political feasibility associated with
the implementation of an emissions permit program: efficiency requires auctioning of permits (no
grandfathering), whereas political feasibility calls for grandfathering.  These results indicate that the trade-
off may be relatively benign: it only takes a small amount of grandfathering, and a small sacrifice in
efficiency, to preserve equity values in the industries that otherwise would suffer most from CO 2  abatement
regulations.
40
Why does a small amount of grandfathering go a long way?  As suggested by the discussion in
Section III, the gain offered to regulated firms by exemptions to a carbon tax or by the free allocation of
emission permits is enhanced to the extent that elasticities of supply are large and elasticities of demand are
low.  In this model, the elasticity of supply is determined by the share of cash-flow (payments to owners of
the quasi-fixed factor, capital) in overall production cost, along with the specification of adjustment costs.  
We find that for the coal and oil&gas industries, cash-flow in the unregulated situation is quite small
relative to production cost, which contributes to a larger supply elasticity.  In addition, although adjustment
costs restrict the supply elasticity in the short run, under our central values for parameters the “average”
elasticity (taking into account the medium and long run) is fairly large.  Indeed, the long run elasticity in the41 In the oil&gas industry, the presence of a fixed factor implies decreasing returns even in the long run.
42 The real net-of-tax price of oil&gas is the only exogenous price in the model.  This price is assumed to
increase at a rate of 2.7 percent per year (in keeping with baseline assumptions employed by the Energy Modeling
Forum at Stanford University).  Hence the ratio of the (constant) real carbon tax rate to the (rising) net-of-tax price
declines through time.  This explains why, in Table 4, the percentage increase in the gross-of-tax price of oil&gas
declines after 2004.
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coal industry is infinite because of the assumption of constant returns to scale.
41   These conditions imply
that most of the cost from abatement policies is shifted onto demand.
Table 4 bears this out.  It displays the impact of a revenue-neutral carbon tax policy (Policy 2) on
gross and net output prices at different points in time.   In the coal industry, the net-of-tax coal price falls a
bit (relative to the reference-case price) in the short run, but the carbon tax is fully shifted in the long run. 
Even in the short run over 90 percent of the tax  is shifted onto consumers of coal.  In the oil&gas industry,
the tax is entirely forward-shifted at all points in time, reflecting the fact that the U.S. is regarded as a
price-taker with respect to oil&gas.
42
In terms of the analysis of Section III, the ability to shift forward the costs of regulation means that
most of the “ R rectangle” lies above the initial price.  When the initial producer surplus or cash-flow is
small in relation to production cost, owners of the quasi-fixed factor (capital) can be fully compensated for
the costs of regulation if they are given just a small piece of the  R  rectangle through grandfathering.
This is confirmed in Table 5.  The table shows the dynamic equivalent of the  R  rectangle under
Policy 2 (carbon tax with recycling through personal income tax cuts) and Policy 6.  To enhance
comparisons between policies 2 and 6, we will interpret each policy as involving emissions permits: Policy
2 is the case of emissions permits with no grandfathering, while Policy 6 involves partial grandfathering to
yield equity-value neutrality.  (As mentioned, one could also interpret these as carbon tax policies, where
Policy 2 includes no inframarginal exemption and Policy 6 involves sufficient exemptions to preserve
equity-value neutrality.)  The second column of Table 5 shows that Policy 2 causes equity values to fall by
$4.9 billion in the coal industry.   This policy requires the firm to purchase $119 billion in carbon
emissions permits.  “Potential carbon payments” is the analog to the  R rectangle: it is the permit price times
the number of permits employed in the coal industry.  For the coal industry this value is $119 billion. 
Under Policy 2, all of the permits are in fact auctioned, and thus the actual carbon payments are the same
as the potential payments.  Note that this number is very large in relation to the reduction in equity values –
$4.9 billion – suffered by the industry.  If only a small fraction of the $119 billion could be retained by
firms, they would be compensated for the $4.9 billion loss.  Under Policy 6, firms can in fact retain a43 One possible extension is to employ input subsidies for selected downstream industries.  Such a subsidy
could insulate downstream users from higher fuel prices.  We are grateful to Ruud de Mooij for suggesting this
option to us.  Another possibility would be to give downstream users some of the carbon (fossil fuel) permits.  This
effectively is a lump-sum transfer to downstream users:  such users could sell the permits to fossil fuel suppliers
and earn revenues that compensate them for the higher costs of fossil fuels.
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fraction of  R.  Enabling firms to retain just 4.3 percent of the potential carbon payments is worth an
amount comparable to the $4.9 billion, and prevents any reduction in equity values.
Thus, in the coal industry, a very small amount of grandfathering preserves equity values.  This
reflects the fact that the potential tax payment (the “ R rectangle”) is large relative to the loss in equity value
in the absence of grandfathering.  This, in turn, reflects the small share of cash-flow in production cost and
the large elasticity of supply, as discussed above.  The result is similar in the oil&gas industry.  However,
in this industry the potential carbon payments are not as large in relation to the loss of equity value.  Hence
the firm must be relieved of a somewhat larger fraction (15 percent) of these payments to suffer no loss of
equity value. 
While Policy 6 preserves profits in the fossil fuel industries, it does not insulate all industries from
negative impacts on profits.  The petroleum refining and electric utilities industries – which utilize fossil
fuels (carbon) most intensively – also endure noticeable losses of profit and equity values, as indicated by
Table 3.  Protecting these industries would require expanded policies involving additional instruments.
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4.  Other Policies Involving Inframarginal Exemptions
The emissions permits policy just analyzed is one of many potential policies that offer
inframarginal exemptions to the regulated firms.  Before investigating policies imposing tax-payment
neutrality, it seems worthwhile to examine some related policies that grant inframarginal exemptions from
carbon taxation. Under Policy 7 we consider the limiting case where 100 percent of actual emissions are
(inframarginally) exempt from the carbon tax or, equivalently, where all emissions permits are
grandfathered.  The results are shown in tables 2 and 3.  Full grandfathering leads to very large increases in
equity values in the regulated industries – especially the coal industry.  These large increases are consistent
with the predicted magnitudes of the rents these policies generate and the associated increases in the
discounted value of after-tax cash-flow.  
We also consider some policies that offer exemptions based on business-as-usual emissions.  In27
particular, we examine the case where firms receive exemptions from emissions corresponding to 50 or 90
percent of their  first-period emissions in the unregulated situation.  These simulations differ in two ways
from the earlier experiments involving exemptions.  First, the exemptions are tied to business-as-usual
emissions rather than to the actual emissions occurring under the new policy.  Second, the exemptions are
constant through time.  (In the earlier experiments, actual emissions tended to grow with time, which meant
that the number of permits in circulation grew as well.)  Since we model a growing economy in which
outputs of all industries tend to increase through time (even under a carbon tax), the exemption represents a
diminishing percentage of actual output.
These policies (numbered 8 and 9) are less generous to firms than the policy involving 100 percent
grandfathering but more generous than Policy 6, which grandfathered just enough permits to assure equity-
value neutrality.  As shown in Table 3, offering a permanent exemption equal to 50 percent of first-year
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions is enough to increase equity values of firms relative to the unregulated
situation: equity values rise by a factor of seven in the coal industry, and by about 22 percent in the
oil&gas industry.  A permanent exemption equal to 90 percent of first-year BAU emissions raises equity
values by more than a factor of 12 in the coal industry and by about 43 percent in the oil&gas industry. 
The government forgoes more revenues under these policies than under Policy 6; accordingly, the efficiency
costs of these policies are somewhat higher than under Policy 6.
C.  Policies Achieving Tax-Payment Neutrality
1.  Industry-specific Cuts in the Corporate Income Tax 
Policy experiments 10 and 11 invoke additional instruments (relative to Policy 2) to yield tax-
payment neutrality for the coal, oil&gas, petroleum refining, and electric utilities industries.  In experiment
10, we introduce industry-specific corporate tax cuts to achieve such neutrality, with a constraint that the
corporate cuts cannot bring the industry’s tax rate below zero.  It turns out that this constraint is binding
for the coal industry: under this policy, the corporate tax rate for this industry reaches zero before tax-
payment neutrality is achieved.  This reflects the fact that this industry’s carbon tax payments are very
large relative to corporate tax payments under the status quo.  In the oil&gas industry, tax-payment
neutrality is achieved when the corporate rate is lowered to .17 from its initial value of .42.28
The corporate tax reductions that move toward tax-payment neutrality (in the coal industry) or
achieve such neutrality (in the oil&gas industry) are much larger than the reduction necessary to achieve
equity-value neutrality (Policy 4), and they imply extremely large increases in equity values relative to the
unregulated situation.  The reason is as follows.  As mentioned earlier, the “average” of short-, medium-,
and long-run elasticities of supply in the model is fairly high.  Thus, overall, firms are able to shift onto
demanders a large fraction of the carbon tax.  Because producers bear only a small share of the tax burden,
only a small corporate tax cut is needed to undo the potential impact of a carbon tax on profits and equity
values.  In contrast, a corporate tax cut that achieves tax-payment neutrality vastly overcompensates firms
in terms of the real burden of the carbon tax to producers -- most of the tax was shifted onto consumers. 
 
2.  Industry-specific Lump-sum Transfers
When we maintain tax-payment neutrality through lump-sum recycling, the efficiency costs are
fairly high.  As in the case with industry-specific corporate tax cuts, lump-sum recycling substantially
overcompensates firms in terms of profits and equity values.  Again the reason is that most of the carbon
tax’s burden falls on demanders rather than suppliers.  But the case with lump-sum recycling is
considerably more costly than the prior case because it lacks the beneficial influence on efficiency
associated with the cut in marginal corporate tax rates.
The efficiency costs, however, do not become as large as with full lump-sum recycling to
households (Policy 1).  The reason is that part of the lump-sum transfers to firms are taxed away by the
personal tax on dividend income when firms pay out these lump-sum transfers as dividends. Since the
personal income tax rate endogenously balances the government budget, the additional tax revenue
associated with the higher dividend income is returned to households in the form of a lower personal income
tax rate.  In contrast, under full lump-sum recycling to households (Policy 1), the personal income tax rate
stays constant. 
It may be noted that ensuring tax neutrality through lump-sum transfers does not have much
consequence for industry-specific output, employment and investment. Lump-sum transfers decouple
interindustry allocation from interindustry distribution.    
These experiments indicate that imposing tax-payment neutrality substantially overcompensates
firms.  While equity concerns might justify compensating firms for lost profits or equity values, they seem
to offer little justification for tax-payment neutrality.  The real-world backing for tax-payment neutrality29
may stem from the misperception that leaving firms’ tax revenues unchanged is necessary to neutralize the
real burden from regulation.
D.  Sensitivity Analysis
Table 6 indicates how key parameters affect results under policies 1, 2, 6, and 7.  Panel A of the
table illustrates the implications of the size of the carbon tax (or extent of abatement).  Here we consider
carbon tax rates of $12.50 and $50.00, as well as the previously considered central-case value of $25.00. 
Impacts on equity values increase with the size of the carbon tax, but somewhat less than linearly.  The
results for the 100 percent exemption case indicate that considerable rents are generated even when the
carbon tax is $12.50 – in this situation, equity values in the coal mining industry rise by almost a factor of
six.  Under all three policies, efficiency costs per ton -- or average abatement costs – increase as the carbon
tax rises from $12.50 to $50.00, attesting to rising marginal costs of abatement.  The efficiency rankings of
the three policies do not change as the carbon tax rate changes.
Panel B reveals the significance of alternative values for elasticity of demand for energy.  The high-
elasticity case involves a doubling, in each industry, of the elasticities of substitution between the energy
composite  E and the materials composite  M, as well as the elasticity of substitution between the specific
forms of energy.  The low-elasticity case halves each of these elasticities in each industry.  For the coal
industry, the high, central, and low elasticity of substitution cases yield general equilibrium elasticities of
demand of .26, .41, and .64, respectively, under Policy 2.  Under every policy, the efficiency costs per ton
of abatement are lower, the larger is the elasticity of demand.  The efficiency rankings of policies remain
invariant across the different demand-elasticity scenarios.  The numbers in parentheses in the columns
associated with Policy 6 are the proportion of emissions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality. 
In keeping with the analysis of Section II, this proportion tends to rise with the elasticity of demand. 
Panel C examines the implications of alternative assumptions for the elasticity of supply.  We
regulate this elasticity by altering the parameter   > in the adjustment cost function for each industry (see
equation (A-2) in appendix).  This parameter determines the marginal adjustment cost, which is inversely
related to the elasticity of supply.  The low adjustment cost (high elasticity of supply) case reduces this
parameter by 25 percent in all industries; the high adjustment cost (low elasticity of supply) case doubles it44 We were unable to obtain a solution for the model when adjustment cost parameters were reduced by
more than 25 percent.
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everywhere.
44   Efficiency costs per ton do not vary substantially with this parameter.  As predicted by the
analysis of Section II, the proportion of emissions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality rises
with adjustment costs (or falls with the elasticity of supply). 
VII. Conclusions
This paper indicates that the government can implement carbon abatement policies and at the same
time protect profits in key industries without substantial costs to the budget and thus to economy-wide
efficiency.  In particular, the government has to grandfather only a small fraction of tradeable pollution
permits, or exempt a small fraction inframarginal emissions from a carbon tax, to protect the value of
capital in industries that are especially vulnerable to impacts from carbon taxes.
In the coal and oil&gas industries, initial cash-flow is fairly small in relation to total cost.  This
small cost share contributes to a high supply elasticity and the ability to shift a large share of the tax
burden onto demand.  The ability to shift a significant portion of the tax burden implies that only a very
small fraction of the potential rents associated with CO 2  policies need to be earmarked for the fossil fuel
industries in order to preserve profits and equity values.  These equity values can be safeguarded through
policies that depart only slightly from the most efficient carbon tax (or auctioned carbon permits) policies. 
The efficiency sacrifice is small.
The simplest programs involving freely allocated emissions permits or inframarginal exemptions to
the carbon tax protect only the fossil fuel supplying industries: downstream industries are not protected.   In
our model, the downstream industries that suffer the largest proportionate reductions in equity values are
the electric utility and petroleum refining industries.  To protect these industries, other policy instruments
would need to be invoked.  We find that the potential carbon revenues are very large in relation to the
revenue that would be required to protect profits in the fossil fuel industries  and the electric utility and
petroleum refining industries.  As a result, in our simulations the profits of this broader group of energy
industries can be protected at relatively small efficiency cost.
Some caveats are in order.  First, our model’s aggregation may mask significant losses in some
industries (such as aluminum manufacturing) that are not explicitly identified.  To protect these industries,31
additional compensation methods would be required.
Second, our model assumes pure competition.  If, in contrast, industries producing fossil fuels
already exercise considerable market power before the carbon tax is introduced, they may have already
enjoyed much or all of the potential rents.  In this case, CO 2  abatement policies may be unable to generate
significant additional rents, and thus the opportunities for achieving equity-value neutrality at low cost may
be considerably more limited.
Third, in our model capital is the only factor that is not perfectly mobile.  To the extent that labor
also is imperfectly mobile, there can be serious transition losses from policy changes, and such losses may
have significant political consequences.  Overcoming barriers to political feasibility requires attention to
these losses.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the forces underlying the political feasibility of CO 2  abatement
policies are complex.  Protecting the profits of key energy industries may not be sufficient to bring about
political feasibility.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the present analysis offers significant hope that some major
distributional concerns related to CO 2  abatement policies can be eliminated at low cost.  Hence the price
tag on removing key political obstacles to domestic CO 2  abatement policies may be lower than previously
thought.32
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Appendix:  Structure and Parameter Values of the Numerical Model
I.   Structure
A.  Production
1.  Technology
a.   General Features
Equations  (1)-(3) of the main text indicated the nested production structure.  The second term in
equation  (1) represents the loss of output associated with installing new capital (or dismantling existing
capital).  Per-unit adjustment costs,   N , are given by:
(A-1) N(I/K) ’ (>/2) (I/K & *)2
I/K
where   I  represents gross  investment (purchases of new capital goods) and   >  and   *  are parameters.  The
parameter    *  denotes the rate of economic depreciation of the capital stock.  The production function for the
oil&gas  industry (equation (4)) contains the additional element   (f , which is a decreasing function of
cumulative oil&gas extraction:
  (A-2) (g,t ’ ,1 1 & (Zt/ ¯ Z)
,2
where    ,1  and   ,2  are parameters,   Zt  represents cumulative extraction as of the beginning of  period   t,   and
  is the original estimated  total stock of recoverable reserves of oil&gas (as estimated from the benchmark ¯Z
year).
The following equation of motion specifies the evolution of   Zt :
(A-3) Zt%1 ’ Zt % Xt
Equation  (A-2)  implies that the production function for oil and gas shifts downward as cumulative oil&gas
extraction  increases.  This addresses the fact that as reserves are depleted, remaining reserves become more
difficult to extract and require more inputs per unit of extraction.
2.  Behavior of Firms
In  each industry, managers of firms are assumed to serve stockholders in aiming to maximize the valueA-2
of  the firm.  The objective of firm-value maximization determines firms' choices of input quantities and
investment levels in each period of time. 
The equation of motion for the firm’s capital stock is:
(A-4) Ks%1 ’ (1 & *)Ks % Is
B.  Household Behavior
Consumption,  labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of an infinitely-lived representative
household  maximizing its intertemporal utility with perfect foresight.  The model employs a nested utility
function.  In year   t  the household chooses a path of "full consumption"   C  to maximize
(A-5) Ut ’ j
4
s ’ t






where    T  is the subjective rate of time preference and   FU   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in full
consumption.  C is a CES composite of consumption of goods and services     and leisure   R : ˜ C













L  is the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure;   "C  is an intensity parameter for leisure.










where  the     are parameters.  The  17 types of consumer goods were shown in Table 1 of the " ˜ C, i( i’1 , . . . , 17 )
main text.
Consumer  goods are produced domestically and abroad.  Each composite consumer good
  is a   CES  aggregate of a domestic and foreign consumer good of a given type: ¯ Ci, i ’ 1,...,17,
(A-8) ¯ C ’ ( ¯ C " ¯ CCD
D¯ C % (1 & " ¯ C )CF
D ¯ C 1/D ¯ C
In  the above equation,   CD  and   CF  denote the household's consumption of domestically produced and foreign
made consumer good of a given type at a given point in time.  For simplicity, we have omitted subscriptsA-3
designating the type of consumer good and the time period.
The  household maximizes utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint given by the following
condition governing the change in financial wealth,  WK :





In  the above equation,     is the average after-tax return on the household's portfolio of financial capital,   YL ¯ r
is  after-tax labor income,   GT  is transfer income, and     is the price index representing the cost to the ˜ p
household of a unit of the consumption composite,    . ˜ C
C.  Government Behavior
A  single government sector approximates government activities at all levels -- federal, state, and local.
The  main activities of the government sector are purchasing goods and services (both non-durable and durable),
to transferring incomes, and to raising revenue through taxes or bond issue.
1.  Components of Government Expenditure
Government  expenditure,   G , divides into nominal purchases of nondurable goods and services ( GP),
nominal government investment  ( GI) , and nominal transfers  ( GT) :
Gt = GPt + GIt + GTt (A-10)
In  the reference case, the paths of  real   GP ,   GI , and   GT  all are specified as growing at the steady-state real
growth  rate,   g .  In simulating policy changes we fix the paths of   GP ,  GI , and   GT  so that the paths of  real
government  purchases, investment and transfers are the same as in corresponding years of the reference case.
Thus,  the expenditure side of the government ledger is largely kept unchanged across simulations.  This
procedure is expressed by:
 GP
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The  superscripts   P  and   R  denote policy change and reference case magnitudes, while   pGP ,  pGI ,  and   pGT
are  price indices for   GP ,  GI , and   GT .  The price index for government investment,   pGI ,  is the purchase
price  of the representative capital good.  The price index for transfers,   pGT ,  is the consumer price index.  The
index for government purchases,   pGP , is defined below.
2.  Allocation of Government Purchases
GP  divides into purchases of particular outputs of the 13 domestic industries according to fixed
expenditure shares:
"G,iGP = GPXi pi  i = 1,...,13 (A-12)
GPXi  and   pi  are the quantity demanded and price of output from industry   i , and   "G,i  is the corresponding
expenditure share.  The ideal price index for government purchases,   pGP , is given by:






II.  Parameter Values
A.   Elasticities of Substitution in Production
       Parameter:    Ff    Fg1    Fg2    FE    FM     Fx
       Substitution  












1. Agric. & Non-coal    
    Mining
0.7 0.68 0.7 1.45 0.6 2.31
2. Coal Mining 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.08 0.6 1.14
3. Oil & Gas
Extraction
0.7 0.82 0.7 1.04 0.6 (infinite)















7. Gas Utilities 0.7 0.96 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
8. Construction 0.7 0.95 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.0
9. Metals & Machinery 0.7 0.91 0.7 1.21 0.6 2.74
10. Motor Vehicles 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.04 0.6 1.14
11. Misc.                      
  Manufacturing
0.7 0.94 0.7 1.08 0.6 2.74
12. Services (except      
    housing)
0.7 0.98 0.7 1.07 0.6 1.0
13. Housing Services 0.7 0.80 0.7 1.81 0.6 (not traded)
B.   Parameters of Stock Effect Function in Oil and Gas Industry
Parameter: Z 0 ¯Z ,1 ,2
Value: 0 450 1.27 2.0
Note:  This function is parameterized so that   (f   approaches  0  as  Z  approaches    ¯Z  (see equation (8)).  The
value  of   ¯Z   is 450 billion barrels (about 100 times the 1990 production of oil and gas, where gas is measured
in  barrel-equivalents.)   ¯Z   is based on estimates from Masters  et al.  (1987).  Investment in new oil and gas
capital  ceases to be profitable before reserves are depleted: the values of  ,1  and  ,2  imply  that, in the baseline
scenario, oil and gas investment becomes zero in the year 2050.
C.   Utility Function Parameters
Parameter: T FU < 0
Value: 0.007 0.5 0.69 0.84Table 1
Industry and Consumer Goods
Industries
        Gross Output, Year 2000*
Level Percent of Total
1. Agriculture and Non-Coal Mining 993.6 6.2
2. Coal Mining                           50.5 0.3
3. Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 193.7 1.2
4. Synthetic Fuels 0.0 0.0
5. Petroleum Refining 324.6 2.0
6. Electric Utilities 234.6 1.5
7. Gas Utilities 211.5 1.3
8. Construction                           1508.8 9.5
9. Metals and Machinery                799.1 5.0
10. Motor Vehicles                       541.2 3.4
11. Miscellaneous Manufacturing      3365.2 21.3
12. Services (except housing)           5183.6 32.8
13. Housing Services                     2420.8 15.3
                                                 
                     
Consumer Goods                            
1. Food                                   






8. Clothing and Jewelry
9. Transportation
10. Motor Vehicles
11. Services (except financial)
12. Financial Services
13. Recreation, Reading, & Misc.
14. Nondurable, Non-Food Household
Expenditure
15. Gasoline and Other Fuels
16. Education
17. Health
* in billions of year-2000 dollarsD














CO 2  Abatement and Profits
RTable 4
Price Responses under Carbon Tax*
Ratio of Price under Policy Change to Reference-Case Price
2000 2001 2002 2004 2010 2025 2050
Coal Industry
               Output price gross of carbon tax 1.1769 1.360 1.546 1.551 1.560 1.570 1.570
               Output price net of carbon tax 0.986 0.978 0.973 0.978 0.995 0.995 0.998
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry
               Output price gross of carbon tax 1.046 1.090 1.132 1.125 1.109 1.083 1.059
               Output price net of carbon tax 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
* Results are for Policy 2, a $25 per ton carbon tax with revenues recycled through reductions in personal
income tax rates.  Coal and oil&gas price responses are very similar under the other carbon tax policies.Table 5
Carbon Payments and Equity Values *
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      Reference Case 17.6 - - - - -
      Standard Carbon Tax (Policy 2) 12.7 -4.9 119.5 - 119.5 -
      Carbon Tax with Inframarginal
        Exemption (Carbon Permits with Partial
        Grandfathering)  (Policy 6)
17.6 - 119.6 .043 114.5 5.1
Oil&Gas Industry
      Reference Case 187.5 - - - - -
      Standard Carbon Tax (Policy 2) 178.0 -9.5 65.8 - 65.8 -
      Carbon Tax with Inframarginal
        Exemption (Carbon Permits with Partial
        Grandfathering)  (Policy 6)
187.5 - 66.0 .150 56.1 9.9
*Values in billions of year-2000 dollars.  Values in last three columns are net of deductions to corporate and personal income taxes (as indicated in equation
(12) of text ).Table 6
Sensitivity Analysis
A.  Sensitivity to Carbon Tax Rate
Carbon Tax with Recycling
via Lump-Sum Transfer
(1)





Emissons Permits for Equity
Neutrality
(6)





Tax Rate $12.50 $25.00 $50.00 $12.50 $25.00 $50.00 $12.50 $25.00 $50.00 $12.50 $25.00 $50.00
Pct. Change in Equity
Value of Firms (year 2000)














    Petroleum Refining -2.7 -5.2 -9.6 -2.3 -4.5 -8.4 -2.4 -4.5 -8.4 -2.5 -4.7 -8.9
    Electric Utilities -3.4 -6.3 -11.2 -2.8 -5.4 -9.5 -2.9 -5.4 -9.6 -3.1 -5.7 -10.3
Efficiency Cost per Ton of
CO2 Reduction
93.1 102.6 126.0 51.7 60.0 77.9 60.2 64.4 83.0 82.5 95.1 109.4
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are proportion of emissions permits required to achieve equity-value neutrality.Table 6, continued
B.  Sensitivity to Elasticity of Demand
Carbon Tax with Recycling via
Lump-Sum Transfer
(1)





Emissons Permits for Equity
Neutrality
(6)
Carbon Tax with 100%
Inframarginal Exemption 
(Emissions Permits with 100%
Grandfathering)
(7)
Demand Elasticity Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Pct. Change in Equity
Value of Firms (year 2000)














    Petroleum Refining -4.6 -5.2 -5.8 -3.8 -4.5 -5.3 -3.8 -4.5 -5.3 -4.2 -4.7 -5.5
    Electric Utilities -4.4 -6.3 -8.3 -3.3 -5.4 -7.6 -3.3 -5.4 -7.6 -3.7 -5.7 -7.9
Efficiency Cost per Ton of
CO2 Reduction
151.9 102.6 60.7 86.6 60.0 38.3 94.5 64.4 38.8 140.0 95.1 48.8Table 6, continued
C.  Sensitivity to Adjustment Costs (Inversely Related to Elasticity of Supply)
Carbon Tax with Recycling via
Lump-Sum Transfer
(1)





Emissons Permits for Equity
Neutrality
(6)
Carbon Tax with 100%
Inframarginal Exemption 
(Emissions Permits with 100%
Grandfathering)
(7)
Adjustment Costs Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Pct. Change in Equity
Value of Firms (year 2000)







    Oil&Gas
    







    Petroleum Refining -5.0 -5.2 -5.4 -4.3 -4.5 -4.7 -4.3 -4.5 -4.7 -4.6 -4.7 -5.0
    Electric Utilities -6.1 -6.3 -6.5 -5.2 -5.4 -5.4 -5.2 -5.4 -5.5 -5.6 -5.7 -5.9
Efficiency Cost per Ton of
CO2 Reduction
101.6 102.6 102.1 57.9 60.0 59.8 62.0 64.4 65.5 90.2 95.1 89.5